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The Club of One

The mark of a good court judgment is its intellectual quality. Some, unquestioned on delivery, are revealed as dubious with the passage of time.

There is nothing compelling about the decision of the Supreme Court in Attorney General v Hamilton [1993] 2 IR 250.

In that case, the Supreme Court decided that the collective responsibility of the Cabinet (the Government) under Article 28.4.1 implied a constitutional bar on the disclosure of dissenting views in Cabinet.

The one does not follow the other of necessity. It may be the norm that dissent is not disclosed; it may be better that disclosure not take place, generally; but it may sometimes be a good thing to make disclosure of dissent. The Supreme Court closed that off. It did so with no significant history of disclosure by Cabinet members (other than selective “leaking” by, usually, the Government itself).

The Taoiseach has adequate powers of discipline to control the members of the Cabinet. If he (or she) cannot use those powers effectively, that is evidence of a political crisis and indicates there ought to be an election. For good reason, the Courts should steer clear of situations like that.

The decision has had bad effects. It endorses a damaging idea of Government; one where the freedom of the Executive to act without challenge and with impunity is put at a higher value than the principle that the interests of the electorate are paramount.

It is a deeply anti-democratic view.

Human Rights

There is an argument to be made that the broad statement in the blog post “Slip and Fall” acknowledging impunity for public authorities for non-feasance is wrong.

Under the European Convention on Human Rights, persons have the following rights;

Article 8: The right to respect for home (private and family life)
Article 2: the Right to life;
The First Protocol, Article 1: the right to protection of property.

Under the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, the Courts are obliged to interpret Irish law to conform with the Convention.

In Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357, toxic emissions from a factory injured many nearby residents and killed some. The ECtHR found that the absence of information on the effects of living near the factory breached the Applicants’ right to respect for home under Article 8 of the Convention.

Consequently, where a failure by public authority would result in a breach of an Article of the Convention, it would be incumbent on the authority to act and the authority would be liable in those circumstances for any failure to so act.

A Right Nuisance!

Just before Christmas, Ireland suffered a number of flooding instances. They did not all have the same cause and cannot all be termed “acts of God”. (Few events in Ireland would qualify in that category).

Dempsey v Waterford Corporation [2008] IEHC featured a case of flooding causing, the Plaintiff alleged, an actionable nuisance. In the case the Defendant was found not to be liable, principally because it did not know of the existence of the sewer from which the flooding came. The law of nuisance requires that the nuisance be caused by the Defendant or be continued by the Defendant after gaining knowledge or means of knowledge of the nuisance. (In short, if the Defendant did not know of the nuisance but ought to have known of it, he will be liable.)

Nuisance does not require proof of negligence on the part of the Defendant. It does not require the Plaintiff to prove the Defendant caused it. It requires the use of land or adoption of use, detrimental to the Plaintiff’s use of his land.

The nuisance is complete if the “use” is complete; in short, the arrival of rain water is not necessary to complete the nuisance, just the conditions on the land that will and do cause the flooding. A blocked or inadequate culvert would qualify, for instance, as a nuisance.

When the Plaintiff proves the nuisance, the onus to exculpate himself falls on the Defendant.

The remedy for nuisance can extend beyond compensation to injunction. The compensation will be an amount sufficient to put the Plaintiff back in the condition he/she was before the wrongful event.

Suggestive

It is an obligation of an advocate, in cross-examination, to convey to the witness the evidence the advocate intends to adduce to rebut the evidence of the witness. This is called “putting” the case to the witness. The witness will have the presumed opportunity to comment on the “case” of the advocate’s witnesses.

The potential penalty for failure by the advocate to do this is a prohibition by the court on the advocate adducing evidence contradictory of the witness’ evidence. In fact, the advocate will, in such circumstances, concede the failure and ask for leave to, belatedly, “put” the case to the witness or witnesses. This may not be convenient (it usually is not) and may be impossible. It will certainly cost money. The cost will be met by the advocate’s client. The court ensures this by permitting the witness to return, conditional on the advocate consenting to an order against his/her client on the costs.

There are often matters on which the advocate has no evidence to present in rebuttal. That does not preclude the advocate from seeking to challenge the witness on the point or points. However, the advocate is not permitted to leave the witness under the mistaken impression that the challenge is the “putting” of the advocate’s case. To avoid this, the advocate “suggests” to the witness that “…………….”. This formulation is a signal to the witness that the advocate is asking the witness to agree or disagree with the advocate and that the advocate is not going to call rebuttal evidence.

Slip and Fall in snow and ice

Many people have been injured in Ireland on public pavements due to the recent snow and ice. Public pavements are “public” because they have been “taken in charge” by the local authority. (If they are not taken in charge they are private pavements.)

It is settled law in Ireland that a public authority is not liable for damage arising from “non-feasance”. This means that, if the public authority fails to exercise a statutory power, and loss is sustained which would have been avoided if the power had been exercised, the public authority is not accountable in law for that failure.

(This does not mean that public authorities are not liable for all failures. They are liable to the same extent as ordinary persons for failure to act; that means that a Plaintiff must prove a duty of care resting on the public authority and loss arising from breach of the duty or care.)

Consequently, a failure by a local, or other, authority to clear snow and ice from roads or footpaths, generally, is an act of non-feasance and attracts no legal liability.

Private persons (adjoining owners and occupiers) have, generally, no liability in common law to clear public roads or pavements of snow and ice. They may have a particular liability; if they place the snow or ice on the road or pavement, or create it in the first place. These acts would constitute a public nuisance. For instance, if the owner or occupier transfers a snow burden from his premises onto the public pavement, the presence of the snow is not “natural”. It is man-made. The owner or occupier had created the condition. For further instance, if the owner or occupier pours hot water on the pavement to melt ice already there, and the water freezes, the new ice will have been created by the owner or occupier.

If the servants or agents of a public authority create a public nuisance, the authority will be liable on the general principles of nuisance.

In the City of Dublin a particular liability rests on owners and occupiers (including local and public authorities) adjoining public pavements to clear the pavement of snow immediately on the cessation of the snowfall. The liability was created by bye-laws of June1899. The bye-laws do not expressly create an entitlement to compensation for persons injured on such un-cleared pavements, but the courts have consistently interpreted such statutory obligations as creating and conferring such entitlement.

The liability for private roads and pavements will be covered by either or both of contractual duties, if any, and the Occupiers Liability Act 1995.

Shut up, Fintan!

The Courts belong to the public world. The speech (and writing) of the courts is public speech and public writing.

Consequently, we in our office occasionally nominate the late Conor Cruise O’Brien as our preferred witness (on any topic, in any case).

He excelled at public speech and writing. He was wonderfully combative and would not suffer fools gladly. In short, he would have made mincemeat of most counsellors. (That’s a good US word to describe a “trial lawyer”).

His gifts were self confidence and familiarity with the public world. Most witnesses lack both to some degree, especially the latter. They are vulnerable, consequently, to mendacious forms of cross-examination.

Conor Cruise O’Brien himself demonstrates this to some degree. He remarked that he recognised his enemies by their approbation of the ideas of Rousseau. This was a harsh standard. Few people know the source or sources of the ideas they use to prop up their speech, not to speak of their lives. To take everything they might say as defining them perfectly is just wrong. To challenge them to defend the propositions inherent in their speech is also, generally, unfair. After all, Rousseau, among other things, undermined the “Ancien Regime”; he pointed to the fact that social conditions were the product of bad government, not the fault of the populace in misery. These opinions would not generally be considered contentious now (among Social Democrats, anyway). Likewise, they are not rebutted by being paraded for inspection with some other doctrine of Rousseau’s, now, perhaps, considered indefensible.

What is the defining characteristic of real troublemakers is their failure to allude to any form of idea in their speech or writing. They seek instead to give the impression that they are simply representative of a general current view, undefined.

They speak in terms of the title to this post.

Creditors’ Meetings

If a trade supplier receives a Notice of a Creditors’ Meeting it means bad news. The money owing to the creditor is in jeopardy.

On receipt of the notice, check to see if it is valid. Under the Companies Acts, the notice must be sent at least 10 days prior to the date of the meeting. The notice must be accompanied by proxy forms. (The proxy forms are important; the Directors will seek to control the meeting with proxies in their favour).

The notice must also be advertised in two daily newspapers circulating in the vicinity of the registered office or principal place of business of the company. Purchase a copy of all such newspapers, promptly. A failure to comply with this obligation will undermine the validity of acts done at the Creditors’ meeting. (The advertisement is intended to alert creditors who have not received notice in the post; if they had attended they could have altered the outcome of the meeting). It is a criminal offence to fail to give proper or adequate notice of the meeting.

The company will have appointed a liquidator at the members’ EGM. That liquidator will attend the Creditors’ meeting. The creditors may propose a different person as liquidator. If a majority of creditors carry that proposal, the “company’s liquidator” will be supplanted by the new nominee. There should not, of course, be a “company’s liquidator”; a liquidator is required by law to be independent of the company or its directors.

Creditors should prepare for the Creditors’ meeting. At McGarr Solicitors we will advise on the questions to be asked by creditors at the meeting and will attend to represent the interests of creditors if asked to do so.

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Abroad

England and Wales have taken strange roads in the administration of justice, so it pays to keep an eye on the legal profession there.

What a pleasure then to discover from the new Chairman of the Bar Council [there], in his inaugural address [see it HERE] that, of former Chairmen;

Some were extraordinarily efficient at chairing meetings; some made a point of sending e-mails at 4.30a.m; some were international class gourmands; others had a wonderful oratorical facility.

Are the barristers bonkers? Did they know of the predilection to 4.30 a.m. emails and still vote for that guy? Did they think the gourmand was even going to give them tips on how to get a piece of that lifestyle?

Of course, he may well have done just that, in which case, bring him back!

Evidence, please

It is surprising how often the willfulness of lawyers or litigants drives litigation, rather than evidence. We see an instance of this in the “theory” that William Shakespeare did not write the “Shakespearean canon” and that the plays and poems were written by, among others, Francis Bacon. This theory was first advanced by Delia Bacon in a book published in 1857.

The essential element of the book, in explaining its success, was prolixity. A work is prolix if it is too long. It is a general human failing to think that there must be substance to something if it can be written about at length.

At any length, Ms. Bacon’s book was too long.

In this vein, some solicitors and some barristers stand out for an inability to produce short affidavits. They talk all around the problem, avoiding the terms in which the opponent has defined the issues. This may be very good in principle, but it is tiresome in practice and oppressive when the prolix affidavit is sworn in the cause of big institutions, for, in truth, this is a feature of struggles with big institutions; they try to talk the problem away.

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