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Stolen goods

Receivers of stolen property do not pay full value for the property. A receiver is a person who buys the property from the thief or someone deriving, consciously, possession from the thief. Anyone in possession after the theft derives possession from the thief, whether they know it or not. The knowledge of the person decides the point as to whether they are a receiver or an innocent person in possession. (That knowledge can be inferred; if the property is bought for a considerable discount on its true value there is an implication that the purchaser knows the goods are stolen. To be suspicious is to know, for these purposes).

In the world of commerce, possession alone is insufficient to transact business; title or ownership is indispensable. (There are very rare exceptions).

Consequently, purchasers of stolen property are at risk of losing the money they pay for the property. We see this in Mallett & Son [Antiques] Ltd -v- Rogers [2005] IEHC 131.

The Plaintiff purchased a piece of furniture from the Defendant. It was an antique piece and of very high value. It had been stolen ten years previously. When the property was located by its true owner as the Plaintiff put it up for sale in London it was returned to the owner and the Plaintiff claimed for its loss against the Defendant.

Amusingly, as recorded by the judge,

“The defendant claims that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence and breach of the duty of care which it owed inter alia to the defendant, by failing to take any or any reasonable steps to carry out appropriate checks on the authenticity of the bookcase (notwithstanding considerable experience and expertise in the buying, selling and restoration of antique furniture).
The defendant claims that if the plaintiff had exercised reasonable care it would have discovered that the bookcase had in fact been stolen and was the property of Lord Roden and would have to be returned to him.”

This was an absurd proposition. On the facts, the Defendant was in the antiques business himself. As a practical matter he was in at least as good a position, as the Plaintiff, to make inquiries.

More importantly, the issue is dealt with in the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (as amended). Section 12 reads:

“(1) In every contract of sale, other than one to which subs. (2) applies, there is
(a) an implied condition on the part of the seller that, in the case of a sale, he has a right to sell the goods and, in the case of an agreement to sell, he will have a right to sell the goods at a time when the property is to pass,
(b) an implied warranty that the goods are free, and will remain free until the time when the property is to pass, of any charge or encumbrance not disclosed by the buyer before the contract is made and that the buyer will enjoy quite possession of the goods except insofar as it may be disturbed by the owner or other person entitled to the benefit of any charge or encumbrance so disclosed.”

The contract between the parties was governed by the terms of the 1893 Act and the Defendant was in breach of the contract. That breach resulted in a claim for £111,533 and judgment in that amount.

OK, Boss. Boss?

Sometimes it is difficult for lawyers to recognize who is the boss.

In Kerr v Molloy and Sherry (Lough Egish) Ltd. [2006] IEHC 364, the defendant contended that the Plaintiff, a contract packer, was more experienced than his then supervisor, an assistant Operations manager and was therefore responsible for the accident in which he was injured. In fact he was working with the supervisor and gave evidence that he believed that the boxes they were stacking were improperly stacked and had informed the supervisor of this. The boxes fell on the Plaintiff. The defendant contended the Plaintiff should have refused to continue the work in the light of his perception. The judge said of this:

“At the hearing of this action, the claim of contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff was advanced on a single ground, that the Plaintiff had more experience in stacking these boxes in containers than Mr. O’Donoghue, so that, even though Mr. O’Donoghue was Assistant Operations Manager of the first named Defendant and, the Plaintiff a contract packer provided by the second named Defendant, the Plaintiff ought to have refused to continue with the work when Mr. O’Donoghue, for whatever reason, continued to build up the row of boxes without staggering the vertical spaces between the individual boxes. I find that the evidence did not support the contention that Mr. O’Donoghue had less experience in this work than the Plaintiff, so that he should be regarded as the helper and the Plaintiff found to be the person in charge of the operation. Mr. O’Donoghue’s own evidence clearly demonstrated that he had ample knowledge and very considerable experience of stacking these boxes in containers. In cross examination Mr. O’Donoghue accepted that he would not expect the Plaintiff to challenge him on any aspect of the job. The Plaintiff protested that having pointed out to Mr. O’Donoghue the possible danger involved in stacking the boxes in the manner in which he was doing it, he could hardly be expected to leave the job and go across to the office and complain to Mr. Bannigan, the Operations Manager. I find that it would be wholly unreasonable to expect the Plaintiff to do this.”

What is often overlooked on these occasions is the effect of a finding of breach of statutory duty against an employer.

On this point the judge said:

“In the Plenary Summons and in the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff pleads his case both in negligence at common law and for breach of statutory duty pursuant to the provisions of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 1989 and, in particular s. 6 and the Fifth Schedule of that Act. I find that the Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence in relation to his claim based upon breach of statutory duty and is therefore entitled to succeed in full against the first named Defendant. It is unnecessary for the court in these circumstances to go on to consider the position in relation to his alternative claim based upon negligence at common law.”

This is a standard outcome of claims against employers by employees.

Yes, Boss!

No! Do not call the judge “Boss”.

When you appear in the High Court or the Supreme Court do what the Minister for Justice has directed HERE.

Call the judge “Judge” (unless he/she is the Chief Justice (or the President of the High Court)).

(It took a very long time to get rid of “their Lordships”. Should we not now discontinue the use of the Irish harp as a symbol of the State? In Italy, the courts exercise power “In the Name of the People”. To corrupt that is more difficult than to hijack an abstract symbol like a harp.)

WAR! WAR?

Ireland has declared for itself a position of neutrality in selected international conflicts

More importantly, the Constitution of Ireland provides in Article 28(3):

“1° War shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war save with the assent of Dáil Éireann.”

Bankrupting the nation aside, it is difficult to know of a more important matter, upon which the Government ought to be restrained, than engaging in a war without the consent of the Dail.

It is alarming therefore to consider what transpired in Dubsky Government of Ireland [2005] IEHC 442

The Applicant applied for Judicial Review of the facilities at Shannon Airport extended by Ireland to the USA for the supply of US armed forces in Afghanistan. He pleaded that these facilities were in breach of Article 28 (3).

The court declined to grant the order sought stating, inter alia,:

“Having regard to the absence of any clear line of authority as to the correct or appropriate legal definition of war, or as to what constitutes participation in any such war, or even as to what consequences flow from the failure to comply with invoked principles of international law on issues of neutrality, it is wholly appropriate that courts should adopt the same highly restrained approach to the question of whether and in what circumstances the executive arm of a government should take decisions relating to war or armed conflict or hostilities of whatever nature.”

Of course, Article 28 (3) is out of date; no State actor in international affairs follows the convention and legal obligation to “declare” war – they just wage it. Nevertheless, as a purely internal Irish affair, to take a hands-off approach to Executive action on such a question, where the Executive can seek the assent of the Dail, but does not, is not in the national interest.

Digital Rights Ireland: Case in HC for Mention

Digital Rights Update

THE HIGH COURT
2006 No. 3785P

Between

DIGITAL RIGHTS IRELAND LIMITED

Plaintiff

And

THE MINISTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS, MARINE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM, THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE GARDA SIOCHANA, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Defendants

UPDATE (25/3/2010)

1. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. has taken a case against the Irish Government as seen HERE.

2. McGarr Solicitors act for Digital Rights Ireland Ltd.

3. DRI brought an application to the High Court to seek a ruling from the ECJ on an EU law issue. The State responded with its motion challenging DRI’s right to bring the proceedings. The Irish Human Rights Commission applied for leave to make submissions in the proceedings. These Motions were heard in the High Court in July 2008.

4. Judge McKechnie reserved judgment on those issues before the Court.

5. The Plaintiff has asked the Court to refer the issue of the validity of Directive 2006/24/EC to the ECJ. The State had brought this question to the ECJ. (The hearing began in the ECJ the very morning the Motions opened before Judge McKechnie). The Plaintiff endorsed the State case but went further; it says the Directive is not valid, not simply on procedural grounds, but on substantive grounds of breach of human rights and the fundamental law of the EU. This was a very important difference between the State and the Plaintiff on the Directive point.

6. The State asked the Court to deny locus standi to the Plaintiff and, in default of success on that request, asked that the Court order the Plaintiff to furnish security for costs to the State. Judgement on these points had also been reserved.

7. The case was mentioned before Judge McKechnie on 25th March 2010 on which occasion he indicated he would deliver his reserved judgment on 21st April 2010.

You Know What I Mean…

Readers will have seen reference HERE to a plea in a medical negligence case as to the meaning of a “consent” signed by the patient (who was having an operation to make her sterile).

In Fitzpatrick v National Maternity Hospital [2008] IEHC 62 the Defendant claimed that the mother (in labour) declined an episiotomy or a forceps-assisted birth (leading to the damage to the infant). The court rejected this plea, and rejected the evidence of the Defendant, intended to evidence it.

In fact the evidence from the defendant was unequivocal; it alleged the parents had each rejected the offered treatment in circumstances where the staff said…

“…they could not be responsible for the consequences for her or her baby.”

… if the mother did not agree to the proposed actions.

The court said:

“I find on the evidence that Senior Midwife O’Dwyer did not, nor did Dr. Wiza, nor indeed did Staff Midwife Murphy (though on the evidence it was hardly her place to do so given the presence of the others) explain the severity of the plaintiff’s condition to either Mrs. Fitzpatrick or Mr. Fitzpatrick at any time prior to the birth of the plaintiff. I cannot imagine how it could be legitimately stated that this couple were extremely difficult to deal with in labour. I have already found that they were encouraged to and did formulate a birthplan which was given to and discussed with Staff Midwife Murphy on Mrs. Fitzpatrick’s admission to the labour ward, who then brought Senior Midwife O’Dwyer into the discussion.”

Policy? What Policy?

When we insure our property, we conclude a contract of insurance with the insurance company.

The terms of the contract will generally be expressed as a “policy”, a particular name for an insurance contract. Sometimes it is not. There may be no actual policy. There may be a “cover note”. This may or may not refer to standard terms. If it does it is a matter of interpretation whether those “standard terms” form part of the contract.

This can cause difficulty for the insured person, but more often than not, it causes profound difficulties for the insurance company.

In Manor Park Homebuilders v AIG Europe (Ireland) Ltd. [2008] IEHC 174, the court heard evidence that the contract of insurance consisted of one word in an email.

This is good news for lawyers, deo gratias.

Limited Liability

Generally, the liability of a solicitor (arising out of his/her professional practise) is unlimited. However, under Section 44 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008, a solicitor may limit his/her liability to a degree not less than the current minimum sum for which a solicitor must carry insurance for (negligence) claims.

That figure is, currently, €1,500,000.

Litigation

Litigation means a resort to the Courts for resolution of a problem. Wikipedia says the conduct of a lawsuit is litigation.

It also says:

“A lawsuit is a civil action brought before a court of law in which a plaintiff, a party who claims to have received damages from a defendant’s actions, seeks a legal or equitable remedy. The defendant is required to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. If the plaintiff is successful, judgment will be given in the plaintiff’s favor, and a range of court orders may be issued to enforce a right, award damages, or impose an injunction to prevent an act or compel an act. A declaratory judgment may be issued to prevent future legal disputes.”

We could go on and on and on about the topic, but this is a blog and we should limit ourselves to the practical.

A typical lawsuit has its origins in a Road Traffic Accident. (“an RTA”). A typical RTA will involve two motor cars. The drivers may have bona fide differing opinions of the causes of the accident. One driver may have sustained more damage than the other. These circumstances may drive the lawsuit.

There are other circumstances that drive a lawsuit. Greed can drive it. Desperation can drive it. Lack of scruples (a sub-set of greed) can drive it. Ambition can drive it.

Most lawsuits are settled. The judicial system is under-resourced to adjudicate on every lawsuit filed in court.

The statistics in the Annual report of the Courts Service of Ireland do not properly reflect this. Take the figures for the High Court civil cases in 2008. There were 22,861 proceedings issued in that year. Allegedly the court made 25,734 orders and there were 4,631 settlements. These two latter figures are categorized as “Cases disposed of”.

In truth the figures for commencement of proceedings and cases disposed of are unrelated. This is so notwithstanding that most proceedings would still be in being one year after being issued. The Court Service statistics take no account of cases commenced and then discontinued. These cases, more often than not, have been settled.

The litigants, with the assistance of the legal profession, settle their cases. (At lunch-time outside the Law Library).

The implications of this, for litigants, is profound. It implies the process is a rational process (on the whole). It is rational in the way a game of chess is rational. The rules and principles are sufficiently clear and well known that the outcome can be predicted with greater or lesser certainty. It is the function of the judges to preserve the integrity of the rules and, exceptionally, expand on them.

Nevertheless, litigation is uncertain. That may mean it is uncertain to the extent of 10% or 50%. The burden of proof in civil law is on the balance of probabilities. To win, a litigant must persuade a judge that what is alleged by that litigant is, on balance, more likely than what is contended for by the opponent.

Failure to settle a case, or failure to settle until “the door of the court” may be caused by a failure to assess where the balance in the case lies, or it may be evidence of a deferment of settlement to the day of trial to maximize the compensation discount a defendant would like to get from an injured plaintiff.

Whatever the case, those causes are in principle, also assessable.

Accident: Frequency (The Law of Averages)

Errors of judgment on the probability of an event are usually incorrigible. In short, even evidence that we are wrong will not persuade us that we are wrong in making a judgment as to whether something is or was probable or not. This is a serious problem. If we remain unaffected by evidence we are very unlikely to seek the advice or opinion of a statistician or other expert to help us estimate the probability of an event.

Road traffic accidents are common, but we rarely witness them happening. If we made a judgment of their frequency based on our experience, we would be wrong.

The title to the post is a tongue-in-cheek reference to “law” as in “law blog” and is, generally, a solecism.

The “law” is a reference to a common error. If we see a roulette wheel or some other random generator device favour red five times in sequence, we believe that the chance of it showing black, the alternative, on the next spin is greater than it showing red. For most people, this is a harmless error, excepting compulsive gamblers and property developers.

The courts, however, engage in exactly this exercise when they decide if something was or was not foreseeable. Clearly, evidence that something is common will secure a judgment that it was foreseeable, but an absence of evidence of the frequency of an event is not itself a basis to infer the frequency of an event; it is evidence of its being overlooked. The overlooking may be by the parties to litigation, or their lawyers, or it may be by the State or statisticians generally.

What is the likelihood of suffering injury from systemic failure in the Irish health system? Not very high, but not a remote possibility either.

We should remember what the statistics from the Personal injuries Assessment Board show us; Road Traffic Accidents are the major source by far of personal injury in Ireland. Even though PIAB does not assess medical negligence claims, such claims would never exceed the Road Traffic claims in frequency.

For more information see our Colour Supplement HERE

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